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Abstract 
The purpose of the REACH Regulation is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and the environment as 
well as the free circulation of substances on the internal market while enhancing competitiveness and innovation. To 
this end, REACH introduces, among other instruments, the authorisation regime for substances of very high concern 
(SVHC) that are listed on Annex XIV of the regulation. After expiration of the transitional period for each Annex XIV-
SVHC, articles, such as most products of daily use, produced in the European Economic Area (EEA) may not contain 
such substances unless an authorisation was granted for the specific use or this use falls within the scope of an 
exemption from the authorisation requirement. The authorisation scheme does, however, only apply to SVHC used in 
the EEA. As a consequence, REACH does not regulate SVHC entering the European market as part of imported articles 
which burden human health and the environment. Moreover, from an economic perspective, domestic articles are 
subject to stricter requirements than those which are produced abroad, putting actors from within the EEA at com-
petitive disadvantage and thus impeding the intention of REACH to enhance competitiveness and innovation. One 
option to close this regulatory gap could be to extend the authorisation requirement to SVHC present in imported 
articles. A legal appraisal on behalf of the German Environment Agency (UBA) assesses whether such option would 
be in accordance with the specifications of WTO world trade law. It concludes that, measured by the standards of the 
WTO dispute settlement practice, such an extended authorisation scheme would neither violate the principles of 
national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. Also, such regulation would not constitute an unnecessary 
obstacle to trade, since the extended authorisation requirement would pursue a legitimate objective covered by the 
regulatory autonomy of the EU and, furthermore, the regulation would not be more trade-restrictive than necessary. 
The contribution at hand summarises the main findings while taking into account first reactions to the legal appraisal.
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Background
Substances of very high concern (SVHC) are identified 
by competent REACH [1] authorities in any EU Member 
State or by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) on 
behalf of the European Commission, based on a highly 
transparent procedure set out in Art. 59(4) REACH, 
including a public consultation giving interested actors 
such as companies, scientists and civil society repre-
sentatives the opportunity to submit incriminating or 
exculpatory evidence regarding the substance. Until mid-
July 2016 169 SVHC have been identified [2]. According 
to the European Commission, by 2020 ‘all relevant cur-
rently known SVHC’, roughly 400–500 substances, shall 
be added to the list [3].
Art. 57 REACH sets out the SVHC criteria. Art.  57   
Para.  (a)–(c) refer to CMR-substances which are classi-
fied as carcinogenic (a), mutagenic (b) or toxic for repro-
duction (c). Substances identified pursuant to Art. 57(d) 
REACH are persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (PBT). 
Art.  57(e) REACH covers substances for which scien-
tific evidence of increased persistence (vP) as well as 
increased bioaccumulation (vB) is available. Finally, on 
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the grounds of Art. 57(f ) REACH other substances may 
be identified, ‘for which there is scientific evidence of 
probable serious effects to human health or the environ-
ment which give rise to an equivalent level of concern to 
those of other substances listed in points (a) to (e)’. The 
toxicity criteria of Art. 57 REACH are, in case of CMRs, 
based on internationally harmonised classification 
requirements according to GHS [4] or, in case of PBTs, 
according to REACH Annex XIII at least more stringent 
compared with the requirements of international law fol-
lowing from the POP-convention [5]. For identification 
of vPvBs as SVHC evidence of toxicity is not necessary. 
However, the indicators to determine bioaccumulation 
in international law sources (POP-convention [5] and 
convention on long-range transboundary air pollution 
[6]) are identical with the vB criteria in Annex XIII, sec-
tion 1.2.2 REACH [7]. Moreover, vPvBs may also unfold 
adverse effects on humans and the environment on the 
long-term, these are, however, due to the substances’ 
properties, difficult to predict [8]. Furthermore, Art. 57(f ) 
classifications may also be founded on GHS criteria such 
as respiratory or skin sensitisation which is, according 
to ECHA, of equivalent concern to CMRs. Other SVHC 
determinations in accordance with this standard include 
endocrine disruptors, the hazard potential of which is 
under discussion but in principle widely recognised [9].
According to Art. 59(1) REACH all identified SVHC 
are candidates for inclusion in Annex XIV REACH, this 
candidate status being the first step to subject a sub-
stance to the authorisation scheme. By mid-July 2016 
Annex XIV lists 31 substances [10]. Examples of listed 
SVHC are DEHP and lead chromate [10]. Following 
Art.  56(1) REACH a manufacturer, importer or down-
stream user shall not place an Annex XIV substance on 
the market for use or use it himself, unless this use is 
exempt from the authorisation requirement or the actor, 
or his supplier, respectively, attained an authorisation for 
the corresponding use. The authorisation scheme thus 
establishes a use specific ban that is effective from a spec-
ified sunset date with permit reservation: by applying for 
authorisation actors may temporarily—according to Art. 
60(8) REACH every authorisation decision is subject to 
review—overcome the barrier of the ban. For this they 
must, prior to the placing on the market or usage, prove 
that the risks posed by the substance use are adequately 
controlled or that the socio-economic benefits outweigh 
the risks [11].
However, REACH regulates only the use of SVHC 
within the European Economic Area (EEA). This holds 
also true for uses in articles. Art. 3 No 3 REACH defines 
the term ‘article’ as ‘object which during production is 
given a special shape, surface or design which determines 
its function to a greater degree than does its chemical 
composition’. Most products used e.g. in private homes 
such as furniture, textiles, toys, books or electronic 
devices are, therefore, covered [12]. Besides, the term 
may refer to complex articles (e.g., bicycle) and also to 
their constituent parts where these parts meet the arti-
cle definition (e.g., bicycle tube) [13]. Whenever the pro-
ducer of an article incorporates SVHC outside the EEA, 
Art.  56(1) REACH does not apply. As a consequence, 
such articles may be imported into the EEA subject to the 
requirements of Art. 7 REACH, but there is no authori-
sation requirement for REACH Annex XIV SVHC con-
tained. At the same time, Art.  56(1) REACH does not 
apply to imported article parts of complex articles which 
are assembled within the EEA.
According to Eurostat data, in 2015, products worth 
more than 3 trillion EUR have been produced and sold 
within the EU market while during that same period 
products worth more than 1,7 trillion EUR have been 
imported into the EU-28 from third countries.1 A high 
share of these products are articles in terms of REACH.
To overcome this regulatory gap which, given the high 
numbers of imported articles, affects most consumers 
in the EEA one possible option would be to adjust the 
regulation text by expressly extending the authorisation 
requirement to SVHC in imported articles. For this pur-
pose Art. 56 REACH could be modified to the extent that 
paragraph 1 also covers the import of an Annex XIV-
substance when incorporated into articles, e.g. in a cer-
tain concentration (hereinafter: extended authorisation 
requirement or scheme). However, such an enhanced 
authorisation scheme affects aspects of international 
trade in goods and, as it happens, the legal omission de 
lege lata is no accidental slip but reflects that until the 
final adoption of REACH the provisions relating to arti-
cles were highly controversial—not least in view of the 
already then virulent debate on the WTO-compatibility 
[14]. Based on the findings of a legal appraisal on behalf 
of the UBA [15] the following sections assess whether 
such option would be in accordance with the legal speci-
fications of the WTO.
Applicable law and scope of the assessment
The extended authorisation requirement constitutes a 
ban and at the same time puts economic operators in a 
position to apply for authorisation (preventive ban with 
permit reservation). In terms of world trade law, the 
prohibition and the lifting of the ban as a result of the 
authorisation decision constitute one single measure 
1 Relevant data can be extracted at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database, c.f. statistics for Intra and Extra-EU trade by Member State and 
by product group [ext_lt_intratrd] and statistics for Extra-EU28 trade, by 
product group [Code: tet00062], both last updated on 1 Apr 2016; both last 
accessed on 18 Jul 2016.
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[16]. Accordingly, this measure is subject to the assess-
ment of conformity with WTO rules. The measure is a 
non-tariff trade barrier with regard to the international 
trade of goods. As the extended authorisation require-
ment features all characteristics of a technical regulation 
set out in No. 1 of Annex 1 to the agreement on technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) the scheme is subject to the legal 
assessment criteria provided in TBT [15].
The central requirements of the TBT Agreement for 
binding technical regulations result in particular from 
Art. 2.1 with respect to the national treatment and most-
favoured nation treatment and from Art. 2.2 TBT con-
cerning the prohibition of unnecessary trade restrictions 
[17]. Accordingly, the legal examination of the extended 
authorisation requirement focuses mainly on the legal 
criteria set out in Art. 2.1 and 2.2 TBT. These formulate 
independent requirements. It follows that, as in the case 
of a violation of Art. 2.1, due to the discriminatory effect 
of a technical regulation, this can be justified in overall 
terms by virtue of Art. 2.2.
National treatment and most‑favoured nation 
treatment
The technical regulation of an extended authorisation 
requirement would violate Art. 2.1 TBT, if (1) the prod-
ucts imported from third countries are ‘like’ products 
from the EEA or products imported from other third 
countries, and, additionally, if (2) the products imported 
from third countries enjoy less favourable treatment than 
‘like’ domestic products or other imported products.
Product ‘likeness’
To determine whether the domestic and the imported 
articles are ‘like products’ the following product pair has 
to be assessed: article A, produced in the EEA and not 
containing any SVHC, and a similar article B, produced 
in a third country and containing one or more Annex 
XIV SVHC.
Assessing product ‘likeness’ has in particular to take 
into account the products’ respective physical character-
istics, end-uses, related consumer tastes and habits and 
tariff classifications [18]. From the standards established 
by WTO case law [15] it follows that articles with SVHC 
and articles without SVHC may often be deemed like 
products in terms of Art. 2.1 TBT. On the one hand, arti-
cles with SVHC frequently pose a certain risk to humans 
or the environment which is due to the exposure in the 
product life cycle that is in practice hardly avoidable. 
Similar products without SVHC do not pose correspond-
ing risks, indicating as a result that the two products are 
not regarded as like products in terms of their properties, 
nature and quality. On the other hand, potential end-
uses will, except in special cases, be identical for both 
products in principle. Moreover, data on consumer tastes 
and habits show that consumers in the EEA do not con-
sistently prefer products without SVHC; rather, relevant 
market segments are likely to exist in which consumers 
perceive the compared articles as substitutable [19]. This 
may result in individual cases where there is evidence in 
favour of the likeness of the products.
However, the question of likeness can only be answered 
conclusively by examining specific product examples; 
depending on the type and function of an article, the 
specific characteristics of the SVHC used and their inte-
gration in the article. If the products are not regarded as 
alike, the technical regulation may not violate Art. 2.1 
TBT and the Art. 2.1 test would thus be completed.
‘Treatment no less favourable’ test
To the extent that products can be deemed alike, the 
Art. 2.1 TBT test next asks whether the extended author-
isation scheme discriminates imported articles because it 
de jure or de facto treats them less favourably than like 
domestic articles or like imported articles of other origin 
[18, 20]. An extended authorisation requirement would 
by design and structure treat imported articles the same 
as domestic articles. Thus, there would be no de jure dis-
crimination of imported SVHC-articles vis-à-vis domes-
tic SVHC-free articles.
Besides, it has to be checked whether the scheme con-
stitutes a de facto discrimination against foreign prod-
ucts. In this respect, all detrimental impacts on the 
competitive opportunities of imported products caused 
by the regulation at hand might potentially be relevant 
for the examination [21]. However, even if detrimental 
effects exist, this impairment could be due to a legiti-
mate regulatory distinction and for this reason be alto-
gether justified [18, 20]. This is also the case with respect 
to the extended authorisation requirement. For instance, 
under REACH, a company needs to be established within 
the community to place substances, mixtures or arti-
cles on the market. The same requirement would apply 
to obtaining the authorisation for use of certain SVHC 
in an imported article. Companies without establish-
ment in the community would thus need an importer or 
an only representative according to Art. 8 REACH with 
establishment in the community to apply for authorisa-
tion, affecting the compliance costs of the company. At 
the same time, companies are not forced to contract one 
of the mentioned actors, unless they refuse establish-
ment of an office in the community. It could be argued 
that the competitive opportunities of foreign compa-
nies without establishment in the community are det-
rimentally impacted [22]. However, the legislator’s 
intention to require establishment in the community 
needs to be appreciated. Generally, legal acts issued by 
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an administrative body may not be served to actors from 
outside EU; the same applies for favourable legal acts. 
Moreover, the objectives of the authorisation scheme 
can only be achieved if the provisions are linked with 
appropriate and effective enforcement mechanisms. To 
this end, the European intermediary is a prerequisite that 
the REACH requirements can be fully applied or, where 
appropriate, enforcing measures (e.g. criminal sanctions) 
can be taken. Hence, the putative impairment of compet-
itive opportunities of imported products would be justi-
fied by legitimate regulatory distinctions in terms of Art. 
2.1 TBT. As a result, the extended authorisation require-
ment would not cause a de facto discrimination.
In addition, as put forward by first reactions to the legal 
appraisal, when preparing the application for authorisa-
tion, EEA based producers of articles can use the struc-
tured system of downstream and upstream information 
and communication concerning chemical substance 
risks, established by Title  IV REACH (‘Information in 
the Supply Chain’) [23]. In most third countries national 
chemicals legislation does not provide comparable infor-
mation and communication tools that can be used by 
article producers applying for REACH authorisation. 
One could argue that this constellation might detrimen-
tally affect the competitive opportunities of foreign pro-
ducers. The latter are, however, free to join forces and 
cooperate with their foreign suppliers or other importers 
based on a model such as REACH. To put such a system 
into effect, they have to spend resources. They might, 
however, allocate the resources which they have saved 
in the first place for not being obliged under the REACH 
downstream and upstream information and communica-
tion system. With a view to the upcoming application for 
authorisation foreign producers have the opportunity to 
focus their expenditures on the specific relevant require-
ments. The domestic producers, on the other hand, are 
obliged to co-finance the entire REACH system (e.g. reg-
istration fees are the core funding of ECHA). Hence one 
could argue that foreign producers are even advantaged. 
In sum, there is no detrimental impact and therefore no 
less favourable treatment in terms of Art. 2.1 TBT.
Conclusion regarding national treatment 
and most‑favoured nation treatment
As a result the extended authorisation requirement is 
compatible with Art. 2.1 TBT. Even in individual cases 
where articles with or without SVHC might be seen as 
‘like’ products there is no disadvantageous treatment of 
imported articles compared to the domestic ones.2 Next, 
the scheme is to be tested whether it constitutes an 
2 A similar conclusion can be found in [24].
unnecessary obstacle to international trade under Art. 2.2 
TBT.
Trade‑restrictiveness of an extended authorisation 
scheme
Art. 2.2 TBT bars technical regulations that are more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective. Since the extended authorisation requirement 
is trade-restrictive (non-tariff barrier) the question is 
whether the regulation is also more trade-restrictive than 
necessary (necessity test). This includes an examination 
of (1) whether the regulation pursues a legitimate objec-
tive, (2) whether it is appropriate to fulfil such objective 
and (3) whether it is more trade-restrictive than neces-
sary to fulfil the objective, taking account of the risks 
non-fulfilment would create. Additionally, the necessity 
test also includes (4) a comparison with possible alter-
native measures. A relational analysis of all four aspects 
and the regulation’s actual intrusiveness allows determin-
ing whether the extended authorisation scheme is more 
trade-restrictive than necessary in terms of Art. 2.2 TBT 
[21].
Legitimate objective
The scheme aims to avoid and reduce exposure of 
humans and the environment to the SVHC-classes 
named in Art.  57 REACH to attain a high level of pro-
tection. The protection of human health and the environ-
ment is also covered by the objectives mentioned by Art. 
2.2 TBT. Furthermore, Recital 6 of the TBT agreement’s 
preamble confirms the right of the Member States to take 
measures at the levels the country considers appropri-
ate, provided the other TBT requirements are complied 
with. As a result, from a combined reading of Art. 2.2 and 
Recital 6 TBT, it follows that the extended authorisation 
scheme’s objectives are legitimate [15].
Appropriateness
The extended authorisation requirement prevents SVHC 
from entering the EEA market as part of imported arti-
cles except where this is justified. The regulation reduces 
thus the exposure of human health and the environ-
ment to ‘very high concern’ substances. At the same time 
REACH enforcement in 18 EEA countries shows very 
low numbers regarding non-compliance in reference 
to the authorisation regime de lege lata (three cases of 
non-compliances in 421 inspections) [25]. The extended 
scheme is, therefore, ‘as written and applied’ [20, 21] 
appropriate to fulfil its legitimate objective [15]; provided 
that resources of enforcement agencies will be adjusted 
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with a view to the new task area of controlling imported 
articles.
Risks of not fulfilling the legitimate objective
Pursuant to Art. 2.2 TBT, ‘technical regulations shall not 
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legiti-
mate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment 
would create.’ Such risks of not fulfilling the legitimate 
objective might thus give hints as to the necessity of a 
technical regulation. Sentence 4 of Art. 2.2 TBT contin-
ues that ‘[i]n assessing such risks, relevant elements of 
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and tech-
nical information […] or intended end-uses of products’. 
To determine the risks in case the authorisation scheme’s 
goals are not fulfilled, the ‘nature of the risks’ to human 
health and the environment caused by SVHC have to be 
examined [21]. Taking into account available scientific 
and technical information as well as intended end-uses 
of products, this analysis includes both procedural and 
substantive considerations as explained in the next two 
sections. From a procedural point of view an assessment 
is necessary whether the risk assessment provided for in 
the extended authorisation requirement is appropriate to 
determine risks in terms of Art. 2.2 TBT. From a substan-
tive point of view the significance which the TBT Agree-
ment ascribes to these risks needs to be considered.
Procedural requirements
Neither the TBT Agreement nor the relevant case law 
contain requirements concerning the risk assessment. 
However, in the interpretation of Art. 2.2 TBT the Appel-
late Body in the dispute settlement system also consults 
the WTO’s other ‘covered agreements’ [21]; a systematic 
comparison with the provisions of the agreement on san-
itary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) and with relevant 
case law which provide more concrete guidelines as to 
the risk assessment seems therefore appropriate [21]. On 
this basis the conclusion can be drawn that the risk 
assessment in accordance with the extended authorisa-
tion requirement conforms to the requirements of the 
SPS Agreement. By implementation of quantitative and 
qualitative risk characterisation methods in the applica-
tion for authorisation (Art. 62(4)(d) REACH in conjunc-
tion with Art. 14 and Annex I REACH) and its review by 
ECHA’s committee for risk assessment (Art. 64(4) 
REACH), the authorisation scheme ensures the assess-
ment of the risks in each application of SVHC in an arti-
cle. This especially holds true with regard to those SVHC 
for which effect thresholds can be derived. But  also in 
cases in which methodological challenges will not allow 
an unambiguous assignment of causality (e.g. vPvBs pur-
suant to Art.  57(e) REACH), the Appellate Body lowers 
[26] the relevant threshold for the determination of 
potential adverse effects down to a level that the extended 
authorisation regime meets [15].3
While according to Art.  5.1 SPS all sanitary or phy-
tosanitary measures have to be based on a risk assess-
ment, risks only have to be ‘taken into account’ in 
accordance with the TBT Agreement. Nevertheless, the 
extended authorisation scheme meets the comprehensive 
SPS requirements for the risk assessment. This gives evi-
dence as to the significance of ‘the risks non-fulfilment 
would create’ in terms of Art. 2.2 TBT. This in turn is an 
indication of the necessity of the extended authorisation 
scheme.4
Substantive requirements
In the landmark EC—Asbestos case in WTO dispute set-
tlement, the, back then, European Community showed 
that asbestos can cause various forms of cancer [16]. 
Given the relevance of the identified risk, its possible 
consequences, and the objective of the tested regulation 
(import ban to ‘halt the spread of this risk’), the dispute 
settlement organs approved the strict regulatory meas-
ure, particularly because it was not possible to derive 
effect thresholds [16].
Asbestos is classified as carcinogen Category 1A and 
thus as a hazardous substance [27]. This classification is 
also one of the criteria of Art. 57 REACH (Paragraph a) 
for the identification of SVHC. In addition, a substance 
may be determined as SVHC—and also listed in Annex 
XIV—due to other high concern properties. These 
include, in accordance with Art. 57(b) to (c), most (d) and 
partially Art. 57(f ), more categories (also) based on GHS 
classifications. For all these substances scientific evidence 
of a hazard potential is available, which in the event of 
exposure may—e.g. under German law5—establish a situ-
ation of danger in the legal sense, against which the state 
is even obliged to take preventing measures (‘Schutzprin-
zip’) [28]. As regards these substances, the ‘nature of 
risks’ is, therefore, to be rated as of similar high concern 
compared to the situation in EC—Asbestos—taking into 
account the high level of protection the scheme aims for. 
Strong evidence can be derived thereof for the necessity 
of the extended authorisation regime.
Of the 169 SVHC identified so far, 149 substances fulfil 
at least one of the CMR criteria [2]. Hence, for the pre-
dominant number of SVHC there is scientific proof of a 
3 The authors in [44] fail to recognise this when they indicate a lack of 
‘sound science’ with respect to regulating SVHC the adverse effects of 
which are difficult to predict.
4 A similar conclusion can be found in [24].
5 The ‘Schutzprinzip’ is codified in all pieces of German environmental 
legislation, e.g. § 5(1) No 1, § 17(1), § 22 BImSchG (Federal Pollution Con-
trol Act), § 6(1) WHG (Federal Water Act), §7(2) No 3, § 9(3), § 9b(4) AtG 
(Atomic Energy Act), § 17 ChemG (Chemicals Act), c. f. Ref. [28].
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hazard potential. However, the extended authorisation 
requirement is also partly based on SVHC whose hazard 
potential involves scientific uncertainty to some extent. 
This second SVHC group includes vPvBs according to 
Art.  57(e) the adverse effects of which on humans and 
the environment are difficult to predict as well as certain 
PBTs according to Art. 57(d) whose classification is based 
on reproductive toxicity pursuant to Annex  XIII, sec-
tion  1.1.3(b) REACH and thus on suspected hazardous 
properties. From a legal point of view, the risks posed by 
these substances would, therefore—in principle despite 
release—be located below the danger level which trig-
gers the ‘Schutzprinzip’ as explained above. Rather, regu-
latory action against these substances is to be classified 
as a precautionary measure. Thus, it has to be examined 
how a technical regulation which is also an expression of 
the precautionary principle must be evaluated in terms of 
Art. 2.2 TBT.
The TBT Agreement itself gives no information as to 
whether a precautionary approach is admissible. How-
ever, relevance of the precautionary principle could 
be derived from international environmental law, the 
requirements of which according to Art. 31(3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties ‘shall be taken 
into account’ when interpreting an international treaty 
such as the TBT Agreement.
International law does not contain a ‘horizontal’ clause 
making the applicability of the precautionary princi-
ple mandatory; a conclusive determination of whether 
the principle has attained a customary international law 
binding status is also not yet possible [29]. However, there 
are increasing indications that such a status exists [30]. 
Furthermore, the wide distribution of the precautionary 
principle in international treaties and other instruments 
also shows that it is of prominent importance at interna-
tional level, especially with respect to preventing negative 
effects caused by chemical substances (Table 1). Many of 
such treaties and instruments reflect the formulation of 
Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development [31]: ‘In order to protect the environ-
ment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for post-
poning cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation’ [29, 30].
Measured by the principles the Appellate Body for-
mulated in US—Shrimp [41], the normative content of 
precaution, therefore, is also considerable for the inter-
pretation of Art. 2.2 TBT. In para 130 et seq. of this deci-
sion the Appellate Body interprets specific rules of the 
general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) in an ‘evo-
lutionary’ way which takes into account the international 
law developments. It follows from this and from the 
international significance of precaution that the principle 
at least informs the interpretation of the environmen-
tal and health protection-related justifications under 2.2 
TBT when a tested technical regulation is (partly) based 
on this principle [15].
Even in cases where the extended authorisation 
scheme is linked to substances whose hazardous prop-
erties are to some extent uncertain it is directed against 
irreversible damage that is also ‘serious’ as is shown 
by specific international law addressing the chemical 
group of persistent substances with a high potential of 
enrichment (i.e. PBT, vPvB)—based on the precaution-
ary principle [5, 39]. Thus, in these cases the extended 
authorisation scheme acts within the scope of appli-
cation of Principle  15 of the Rio Declaration. The risks 
associated with the precaution categories of Art. 57 
REACH are, therefore, by no means insignificant. This is 
particularly true because neither the TBT nor the Appel-
late Body [42] require a minimum amount for a risk to 
be detected.
Furthermore, the extended authorisation requirement’s 
legitimate objective has to be taken into account [16, 21] 
which is to ensure a high level of protection for human 
health and the environment by reducing the risks of 
SVHC. The SVHC criteria are an expression of this level 
of protection, the adoption of which—according to an 
evolutionary interpretation of Art. 2.2 TBT in the light of 
the requirements of the precautionary principle—is cov-
ered by the regulatory autonomy of the Member States of 
the Agreement. A non-fulfilment of the normative goals 
would, therefore, cause unacceptable risks, irrespective 
of the specific SVHC category. This again underscores 
the necessity of the scheme [15].
Possible alternative measures
The necessity test includes the assessment of possible 
alternative measures. A measure might be preferable 
compared to the extended authorisation requirement, if 
it represents a less intrusive trade-restriction, reaches an 
equal or higher contribution to the legitimate objective 
and is reasonably available [21].
An alternative measure available from the outset would 
be the restriction provided for in Art. 69(2) REACH that 
is specifically tailored for Annex  XIV SVHC in articles 
irrespective of their origin. Restrictions often contain 
article-specific or application-specific exceptions or limit 
values. Restrictions do not provide for a permit reserva-
tion, indicating more intrusiveness than the authorisa-
tion scheme.
More important, the authorisation and restriction 
regimes significantly differ as regards their protective 
functions:
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  • In the case of authorisation, companies must demon-
strate that risks arising from the use of the SVHC in 
articles are adequately controlled while in the restric-
tion procedure following Art.  69(2) in conjunction 
with No 3 of Annex  XV REACH the ECHA has to 
prove that respective uses pose an unacceptable risk 
that needs to be addressed Union-wide.
  • Both instruments are dealing with different kinds 
of risks. The restriction procedure addresses unac-
ceptable risks that regulatory bodies are aware of 
Table 1 Selection of references to the precautionary principle in international law
Short title of document Reference Wording
Montreal protocol [32] Preamble, para. 6 ‘Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures 
to control equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, 
with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the basis of develop-
ments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic 
considerations’
2nd North Sea Conference Ministerial Declaration [33] Preamble, para. 7 ‘[I]n order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the 
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which 
may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a 
causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence’
Bergen Ministerial Declaration [34] Para. 7 ‘In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on 
the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, 
prevent, and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation’
Bamako convention [35] Art. 4(3)(f ) ‘Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precaution-
ary approach to pollution problems which entails, inter-alia, preventing 
the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to 
humans or the environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding 
such harm’
Water convention [36] Art. 2(5)(a) ‘[…] the Parties shall be guided by the following principles: The precaution-
ary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the potential transbound-
ary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed 
on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a causal link 
between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential transbound-
ary impact, on the other hand’
Framework convention on climate change [37] Art. 3(3) ‘The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
tific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, 
taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change 
should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest pos-
sible cost’
Biodiversity convention [38] Preamble, para. 9 ‘Noting also that where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of 
biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat’
OSPAR convention [39] e.g. Art. 2(2)(a) ‘The Contracting Parties shall apply: the precautionary principle, by virtue 
of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable 
grounds for concern that substances or energy […] bring about hazards 
to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems […] even 
when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the 
inputs and the effects’
Cartagena protocol [40] e.g. Art. 1 ‘In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this 
Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms […]’
POP convention [5] Art. 1 ‘Mindful of the precautionary approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Con-
vention is to protect human health and the environment from persistent 
organic pollutants’
Art. 8(9) ‘The Conference of the Parties, taking due account of the recommendations 
of the Committee, including any scientific uncertainty, shall decide, in a 
precautionary manner, whether to list the chemical, and specify its related 
control measures […]’
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and able to substantiate. In contrast, the authorisa-
tion requirement is triggered by a hazard potential, 
including situations where these are to some extent 
uncertain.
  • Only in the authorisation scheme each (group) appli-
cation for a substance use must be examined allow-
ing for adequate single case decisions to be taken.
  • The authorisation requirement applies with effect of 
the sunset date stipulated in the specific Annex XIV 
entry, while in the case of the restriction according to 
Article 69(2) REACH ECHA starts to consider action 
only after such date.
The authorisation requirement aims to ensure a high 
level of protection by reducing emissions of SVHC from 
imported articles. Taking into account the overall purposes 
of REACH the restriction scheme also aims to ensure a 
high level of protection. However, with respect to reducing 
emissions of SVHC from imported articles, the comparison 
of both instruments shows that the authorisation scheme 
is clearly more effective since the respective requirement 
comes into effect more quickly, it shifts the burden of proof 
to the actors responsible for the possible risk and allows for 
case-by-case decisions to grant authorisation. The restric-
tion in turn is not equally effective and, therefore, no pref-
erable measure in terms of Article 2.2 TBT. Similarly, other 
alternative measures such as extended information and 
communication obligations for SVHC in imported articles 
or labelling obligations for this product group might be less 
intrusive than the extended authorisation scheme but at the 
same time not as effective [15].
‘Relational analysis’ and conclusion regarding trade 
restrictiveness
The technical regulation of an extended authorisation 
scheme aims to prevent the risks posed by SVHC in 
imported articles. For all SVHC ‘scientific evidence of 
probable serious effects to human health or the environ-
ment’6 is available and every authorisation process 
includes, among other aspects such as socio-economic 
considerations, a comprehensive risk assessment. The 
technical regulation restricts international trade by 
imposing an authorisation requirement for SVHC listed 
in Annex XIV REACH and that are used in imported 
articles. However, article producers may lift the ban by 
proving that the risks posed by the substance use are ade-
quately controlled or that the socio-economic benefits 
outweigh the risks. This instrumental design attenuates 
the measure’s intrusiveness. Moreover, the technical reg-
ulation is likely to make a significant contribution to its 
6 Art. 57(f ) REACH stipulates this as a minimum standard for identification 
of a substance as SVHC.
purposes while these purposes are legitimate objectives 
under Article 2.2 TBT. As no equally effective alternative 
means are available, the overall view of these facts leads 
to the conclusion that the extended authorisation 
requirement is not more trade-restrictive than necessary 
in terms of Article 2.2 TBT.
Overall conclusion
In summary, the regulatory option of an extended 
authorisation requirement would not violate the prin-
ciples of national treatment and most-favoured nation 
treatment according to Art. 2.1 TBT, nor would it consti-
tute an unnecessary trade restriction within the meaning 
of Article 2.2 TBT. These results are also consistent with 
the key objectives of the WTO, which foresee free inter-
national commodity trading contributing to the improve-
ment of living standards and quality of life and the 
protection of the environment [43]. At the same time, the 
analysis shows that the option of an extended authorisa-
tion regime could become meaningful with regard to the 
next comprehensive review of the REACH Regulation.
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